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Contextual modulation of value signals in reward
and punishment learning
Stefano Palminteri1,2, Mehdi Khamassi3,4, Mateus Jofﬁly4,5 & Giorgio Coricelli2,4,6
Compared with reward seeking, punishment avoidance learning is less clearly understood
at both the computational and neurobiological levels. Here we demonstrate, using
computational modelling and fMRI in humans, that learning option values in a relative—
context-dependent—scale offers a simple computational solution for avoidance learning. The
context (or state) value sets the reference point to which an outcome should be compared
before updating the option value. Consequently, in contexts with an overall negative expected
value, successful punishment avoidance acquires a positive value, thus reinforcing the
response. As revealed by post-learning assessment of options values, contextual inﬂuences
are enhanced when subjects are informed about the result of the forgone alternative
(counterfactual information). This is mirrored at the neural level by a shift in negative
outcome encoding from the anterior insula to the ventral striatum, suggesting that value
contextualization also limits the need to mobilize an opponent punishment learning system.
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I
n the past decades, signiﬁcant advances have been made in
the understanding of the computational and neural bases of
reward-based learning and decision making. On the other hand,
computations and neural mechanisms mediating punishment-
based learning and decision making remain more elusive1,2.
The ﬁrst problem is computational. In fact, avoidance learning
faces an apparent paradox: once a punishment is successfully
avoided, the instrumental response is no longer reinforced. As a
consequence, basic learning models predict better performance
on reward learning (in which the extrinsic reinforcements are
frequent, because they are sought) compared with punishment
learning (in which the extrinsic reinforcements are infrequent,
because they are avoided), despite the fact that human subjects
have been shown to learn equally well in both domains3–6.
The second problem is neuroanatomical: a debate in cognitive
neuroscience concerns whether the same brain areas (namely the
ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex)
represent positive as well as negative values or, alternatively,
aversive value encoding and learning are organized in an
opponent system (namely the insula and the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex)7–12.
We hypothesized that the two questions could be resolved in
the framework of value context dependence. Recently, context
dependence of option values has provided a formal framework to
understand adaptive coding and range adaptation of value-
responsive neurons and brain areas13–16. Concerning punishment
learning, operationalizing the principle behind the two-factor
theory, we propose that successful avoidance, which is a neutral
outcome in an absolute scale, acquires a positive value because it
is computed relative to the value of its choice context, which is
negative17–19. In other words, successful avoidance is ‘reframed’
as a positive outcome20. On the other side, divergent functional
magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) ﬁndings could be
reconciled assuming that, in absence or limited contextual
information, punishments and rewards are implemented in
opponent channels; subsequently, if contextual information is
acquired or provided, outcome representations converge to the
ventral frontostriatal system. This is supported by the fact that
ventral striatal and prefrontal responses to punishment avoidance
were observed in situations in which the value of the context was
made explicit by instruction or overtraining21–23.
To test these hypotheses, healthy subjects underwent fMRI
scanning while performing an instrumental learning task,
involving multiple two-armed bandits (choice contexts) and
followed by a post-learning assessment of option values. Two
features of the task served our purposes: ﬁrst, the task contrasted
reward seeking with punishment avoidance learning; second,
in speciﬁc choice contexts, we provided the information
about the outcome of the foregone alternative—counterfactual
information—to enhance relative value encoding24–26. We
reasoned that presenting subjects with both the outcomes of the
chosen and the unchosen options would facilitate the learning of
the average value of the choice context (that is, the context value).
We found behavioural and neural evidence consistent with the
idea that providing both the outcomes of the chosen and the
unchosen options favoured the learning of a context-speciﬁc
reference point. Behavioural results indicated that subjects learn
similarly well reward seeking and punishment avoiding: a result
that was efﬁciently captured by a computational model that
embodies the idea of relative value learning. The same model was
able to account for context dependence-induced valuation biases,
as revealed by the post-learning test, speciﬁcally for options learnt
in the presence of counterfactual feedback. fMRI analyses served
two purposes. First, we used neural data to provide further
experimental support to the computational analyses. Crucially
model-based and model-free fMRI analyses concordantly
indicated that neural activity in the brain valuation system was
better explained assuming relative, than absolute value learning.
Second, fMRI permitted us to reconcile previous discordant
ﬁndings advocating for anatomical overlap or dissociation
between reward seeking and punishment avoidance neural
systems. In fact, the observed increase in contextual discrimina-
tion in the complete feedback conditions was followed by a shift
in the neural encoding of negative outcomes from the insula to
the ventral striatum.
Results
Experimental design. Healthy subjects performed a probabilistic
instrumental learning task with monetary gains and losses,
adapted from those used in previous imaging, pharmacological
and lesion studies3,6,27,28. The novel task presented a 2 2
factorial design with outcome valence (reward or punishment)
and feedback information (partial or complete) as factors
(Fig. 1a,b). In the learning task, options (materialized as
abstract symbols) were always presented in ﬁxed pairs. The
ﬁxed pairs of options represented stable choice contexts, with
different overall expected value. In each context the two options
were associated with different, but stationary, outcome
probabilities, so that the subjects’ task was learning to choose
the options associated either with highest reward probability or
those associated with lowest punishment probability (correct
options: G75 and L25 in the reward and the punishment context,
respectively; incorrect options: G25 and L75 in the reward
and the punishment context, respectively). Subjects performed
four sessions of the task during fMRI scanning, each
involving novel pairs of options. After the last session, subjects
performed a post-learning test in which they were asked to
indicate the option with the highest value, in choices involving all
possible binary combinations—that is, including pairs of options
that had never been associated during the task (Fig. 1c). As in
previous studies, post-learning test choices were not followed by
feedback, to not interfere with subjects’ ﬁnal estimates of option
values29,30.
Instrumental performance. We found signiﬁcant evidence of
instrumental learning (that is, participants sought rewards or
avoided punishments; Table 1). Indeed, average correct response
rate was signiﬁcantly higher than chance level (that is, 0.5) in all
contexts (T47.0, Po0.001; Fig. 2a). A two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) showed no effect of outcome valence (F¼ 1.4,
P40.2), a signiﬁcant effect of feedback information (F¼ 30.7,
Po0.001), and no signiﬁcant interaction (F¼ 0.7, P40.7).
Accordingly, post hoc investigation showed performances in
complete feedback contexts as signiﬁcantly higher compared
with the partial feedback contexts (reward and punishment
contexts: T43, Po0.01). Thus, as in previous studies, healthy
subjects learnt similarly from reward and punishments3,29, and
efﬁciently integrated counterfactual information in instrumental
learning31–33 (see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary
Fig. 1 for reaction times data analysis).
Post-learning choices. We found signiﬁcant evidence of value
retrieval during the post-learning test (Table 1)29,30. Indeed,
a three-way ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant effect of outcome
valence (F¼ 53.0, Po0.001) and a signiﬁcant effect of option
correctness (F¼ 170.1, Po0.001), but no effect of feedback
information (F¼ 0.0, P40.5; Fig. 2b). The only interaction that
reached statistical signiﬁcance was the correctness x feedback
information (F¼ 11.9, Po0.01). As for other interactions (double
or triple), none reached statistical signiﬁcance (all: Fo2.0,
P40.1). A two-way ANOVA limited on the intermediate value
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options (that is, the less rewarding option in the reward contexts
and the less-punishing option in the punishment contexts G25
and L25) with valence and feedback information as factors,
crucially showed no signiﬁcant effect of valence (F¼ 1.6, P40.2)
nor of feedback information (F¼ 0.2, P40.2), but a signiﬁcant
interaction (F¼ 9.4, Po0.01), thus reﬂecting an inversion in the
evaluation of intermediate options, when moving from the partial
to the complete feedback information contexts. More precisely,
post hoc tests revealed that the percentage of choices towards the
correct option of the punishment/complete context (L25) was
higher compared with that towards the incorrect option in the
reward/complete context (G25; T¼ 3.2, Po0.01), despite their
absolute expected value (EV; Probability(outcome)Magnitude
(outcome)) suggesting the opposite. (EV(L25)¼  12.5b;
EV(G25)¼ þ 12.5b). Post hoc analysis also showed a
signiﬁcantly different choice rates for the correct options in the
reward compared with the punishment context (G75 versus L25 in
both feedback information contexts: T44.6, Po0.001), despite
similar choice rate in the learning task (see also Supplementary
Table 1). This indicated that post-learning choices could be
explained neither by assuming that option values were encoded in
an absolute manner, nor by assuming that they were merely
reﬂecting past choice propensity (policy), but that they laid
somehow halfway between these two extremes: a phenomenon
that is parsimoniously explained by context-dependent option-
value learning.
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Figure 1 | Experimental task and design. (a) Learning task 2 2 factorial design with 4 different contexts: reward/partial, punishment/partial, reward/
complete, and punishment/complete. PGain¼ probability of winning 0.5h; PLoss¼ probability of losing 0.5h. Note that the coloured frames are introduced
in the ﬁgure for illustrative purposes, but were not present in the original task. (b) Successive screens of typical trials in the reward partial (top) and
complete (bottom) contexts. Durations are given in milliseconds. (c) Time course of the experiment. Note that the post-learning test was uniquely based
on the eight options of the last learning session.
Table 1 | Experimental and computational model-derived variables.
Dependent variables DATA ABSOLUTE RELATIVE
Learning test: correct choice rate
Reward partial (% correct) 0.73±0.03 0.75±0.02 0.74±0.02
Punishment partial (% correct) 0.74±0.03 0.70±0.02 0.72±0.02
Reward complete (% correct) 0.83±0.02 0.83±0.02 0.84±0.02
Punishment complete (% correct) 0.86±0.02 0.81±0.02* 0.84±0.02
Post-learning test: choice rate
G75 partial (% choices) 0.78±0.04 0.86±0.01 0.85±0.01
G25 partial (% choices) 0.51±0.06 0.58±0.01 0.54±0.01
L25 partial (% choices) 0.45±0.04 0.37±0.01 0.45±0.01
L75 partial (% choices) 0.25±0.03 0.17±0.01 0.16±0.01
G75 complete (% choices) 0.83±0.03 0.91±0.01 0.83±0.02
G25 complete (% choices) 0.40±0.04 0.66±0.01* 0.38±0.03
L25 complete (% choices) 0.61±0.03 0.37±0.01* 0.62±0.03
L75 complete (% choices) 0.17±0.03 0.08±0.01 0.16±0.02
ABSOLUTE, absolute value learning model; DATA, experimental data; RELATIVE, relative value learning model (best-ﬁtting model).
The table summarizes for both tasks their experimental and model-derived dependent variables. Data are expressed as mean±s.e.m.
*Po0.05, t-test, comparing the model-derived values with the actual data after correcting for multiple comparisons (N¼ 28).
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Computational models. We ﬁtted the behavioural data with
model-free reinforcement-learning models (see Methods)34. The
tested models included a standard Q-learning (thereafter referred
to as ABSOLUTE), adapted to account for learning from
counterfactual feedback, which has been most frequently used
with this kind of task and we therefore consider as the reference
model (hypothesis zero)3,6,27,28,33. We also considered a modiﬁed
version of the ABSOLUTE model, which, similarly to other
theories assumes that choice context (or state) values are
separately learnt and represented35,36. The crucial feature of
this model (thereafter referred to as RELATIVE) is that the
context value sets the reference point to which an outcome should
be compared before updating the option value; option values are
therefore no longer encoded in an absolute, but in a relative scale
(Fig. 3). The context value (V(s)) is deﬁned as a ‘random-policy’
state value, aimed at capturing the overall expected value of a
given pair of options, independent from subjects’ choice
propensity. Note that the RELATIVE model shares a
crucial feature (that is, relative option value encoding) with
previous computational formulations, such as actor–critic and
advantage learning models, that inspired its conception (see
Supplementary Note 2 for additional model comparison
including these preceding models and a discussion of their
differences)37,38.
Bayesian model selection. For each model, we estimated the free
parameters by likelihood maximization (to calculate the Akaike
Information Criterion, AIC, and the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion, BIC) and by Laplace approximation of the model evi-
dence (to calculate the exceedance probability; Tables 2 and 3).
After post hoc analyses we found that the RELATIVE model
better accounted for the data, both at ﬁxed and random effect
analysis (compared with the ABSOLUTE LL: T¼ 4.1, Po0.001).
This was also true when accounting (penalizing) for the different
number of free parameters (AIC: T¼ 3.4, Po0.001; BIC: T¼ 2.1,
Po0.05)39. We also calculated the exceedance probability (XP) of
the model based on an approximate posterior probability of the
model, and we consistently found that our model signiﬁcantly
outperformed the others (XP¼ 1.0)40. Thus, context-dependent
value encoding (RELATIVE) provided better account of learning
test choices, even after correcting for its higher degrees of
freedom (note that this conclusion was not affected by using
different learning rates for the reward and the punishment
contexts).
Relative value encoding explains instrumental performance.
To characterize the effect of context-dependent over absolute
value learning, we generated for each trial t the probability of
choosing the best option according to the models, given the
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Figure 2 | Behavioural results and model simulations. (a) Correct choice rate during the learning test. (b) Choice rate in the post-learning test. G75 and
G25: options associated with 75% and 25% per cent of winning 0.5h, respectively; L75 and L25: options associated with 75% and 25% per cent of losing
0.5h, respectively. EV: absolute expected value (Probability(outcome)Magnitude(outcome)) in a single trial. The values þ 37.5b and  37.5b
correspond G75 and the L75 options, respectively. In a and b coloured bars represent the actual data and black (RELATIVE) and white (ABSOLUTE) dots
represent the model simulated data. (c) Reward minus punishment correct choice rate during the learning test. (d) G25 minus L25 choice rate during the
post learning test. *Po0.05 one sample t-test; NS, not signiﬁcant (N¼ 28). Error bars represent s.e.m.
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subjects’ history of choices and outcomes at trial
t 1 (Fig. 2a) and the individual best-ﬁtting free parameters.
We submitted model-simulated choice probabilities to the same
statistical analyses reported above for their model-free counter-
part. The RELATIVE model’s choices showed no effect of
outcome valence (F¼ 0.7, P40.7), a signiﬁcant effect of feedback
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Figure 3 | Computational architecture. The schematic illustrates the computational architecture used for data analysis. For each context (or state) ‘s’, the
agent tracks option values (Q(s,:)), which are used to decide amongst alternative courses of action. In all contexts, the agent is informed about the outcome
corresponding to the chosen option (R(c)), which is used to update the chosen option value (Q(s,c)) via a prediction error (d(c)). This computational
module (‘factual learning’) requires a learning rate (a1). In the complete feedback condition, the agent is also informed about the outcome of the unselected
option (R(u)), which is used to update the unselected option value (Q(s,u)) via a prediction error (d(u)). This computational module (‘counterfactual
learning’) requires a speciﬁc learning rate (a2). In addition to tracking option value, the agent also tracks the value of the context (V(s)), which is also
updated via a prediction error (d(v)), integrating over all available feedback information (R(c) and R(u), in the complete feedback contexts and Q(s,u) in the
partial feedback contexts). This computational module (‘contextual learning’) requires a speciﬁc learning rate (a3). The RELATIVE model can be reduced to
the ABSOLUTE model by suppressing the contextual learning module (that is, assuming a3¼0).
Table 2 | Model comparison criteria.
Model DF  2*LLmax 2*AIC BIC  2*LPP PP XP
ABSOLUTE 3 307±20 319±20 325±20 314±20 0.08±0.03 0.0
RELATIVE 4 295±22 311±22 319±22 304±21 0.92±0.03 1.0
AIC, Akaike Information Criterion (computed with LLmax); BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion (computed with LLmax); DF, degrees of freedom; LLmax, maximal log likelihood; LPP, log of posterior
probability; PP, posterior probability of the model given the data; XP, exceedance probability (computed from LPP).
The table summarizes for each model its ﬁtting performances.
Table 3 | Computational free parameters.
LL maximization LPP maximization
Free parameter ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE
Inverse temperature (b) 17.4±5.92 21.52±5.95 11.4±0.97* 13.66±1.32*
Factual learning rate (a1) 0.28±0.02 0.19±0.02 0.29±0.02* 0.20±0.01*
Counterfactual learning rate (a2) 0.18±0.02 0.15±0.02 0.20±0.02* 0.16±0.02*
Context learning rate (a3) — 0.33±0.07 — 0.34±0.07*
ABSOLUTE, absolute value learning model; RELATIVE, relative value learning model (best-ﬁtting model); LL maximization, parameters obtained when maximizing the negative log likelihood; LPP
maximization, parameters obtained when maximizing the negative log of the Laplace approximation of the posterior probability.
The table summarizes for each model the likelihood maximizing (‘best’) parameters averaged across subjects. Data are expressed as mean±s.e.m.
The average values retrieved from the LL maximization procedure are those used to generate the parametric modulators of GLM1a and GLM1b.
*Po0.001 when correlating the LPP-based with LL-based free parameters (robust regression, N¼ 28).
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information (F¼ 53.4, Po0.001), and no signiﬁcant interaction
(F¼ 0.7, P40.4): the same statistical pattern as the actual data.
The ABSOLUTE model choices displayed a signiﬁcant effect
of outcome valence (F¼ 7.0, Po0.05), a signiﬁcant effect of
feedback information (F¼ 43.1, Po0.001), and a signiﬁcant
interaction (F¼ 4.2, Po0.05): a different statistical pattern
compared to the actual data (Fig. 2c). A post hoc test showed
lower performances in punishment/partial compared with the
reward/partial context (T¼ 2.4, Po0.05; Table 1). In fact, in
the ABSOLUTE model, the model’s estimate of the decision
value—deﬁned as the difference between the correct and the
incorrect option value—was signiﬁcantly reduced in the
punishment/partial compared with the reward/partial context
(þ 15.9±1.2b versus þ 25.6±1.8b; T¼ 6.5, Po0.001; Fig. 4a).
This naturally emerged from the reduced sampling of the G25 and
L75 options respectively, induced by correct responding. This
effect formally instantiates the computational problem inherent
to punishment avoidance. This effect is not present in the
RELATIVE model, in which, thanks to option value centring
(that is, RC,t—Vt(s) in dC; and RU,t—Vt(s) in dU), decision values
were similar in the reward and punishment domains (ﬁnal
decision values: þ 17.3±1.4b versus þ 15.1±1.2b; T¼ 1.7,
P40.1; Fig. 4b). Thus, as predicted from the analysis of
model-derived option values, absolute value learning suffers from
not being able to adequately ﬁt symmetrical performances in the
reward and punishment domains. The introduction of value
contextualization proved sufﬁcient to obviate this deﬁciency
(Table 1 and Fig. 2c).
Relative value encoding explains post-learning choices. To
further probe the explanatory power of context-dependent
(relative) over absolute value learning, we assessed and compared
their ability to explain post-learning test choices (Fig. 2b). First,
we found that the cumulative log-likelihood of the post-learning
test was signiﬁcantly higher assuming choices based on ﬁnal
option values obtained by the RELATIVE, compared with those
by the ABSOLUTE model ( 172.1±11.5 versus  220.3±16.7;
T¼ 7.0, Po0.001; predictive performances). Second, the post-
learning choices simulated with the ABSOLUTE option values,
produced a different behavioural pattern than the actual choices,
speciﬁcally failing to capture the value inversion between inter-
mediate value options (G25 and L25) in the complete feedback
contexts (generative performances). Indeed, a two-way ANOVA
on the RELATIVE simulated choices limited to the intermediate
value options, with valence and feedback information as factors,
showed, no signiﬁcant main effect of valence (F¼ 2.5, P40.1), in
line with actual data. The same analysis applied to ABSOLUTE
simulated choices produced a signiﬁcant effect of valence
(F¼ 660.2, Po0.001), contrary to actual data (Fig. 2d). Post hoc
tests showed that the RELATIVE model ﬁtted signiﬁcantly higher
choice rate for the complete L25 option compared with the
complete G25 as observed in the behavioural data (T¼ 3.4,
Po0.001), whereas the ABSOLUTE model generated a signiﬁcant
opposite effect (T¼ 19.2, Po0.001; Table 1). In fact, because
of the additional (counterfactual) information provided to sub-
jects, choice context values were better resolved in the complete
compared with the partial feedback information contexts (ﬁnal
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reward minus punishment context values: DVComplete¼
þ 33.6±2.3b versus DVPartial¼ þ 22.4±3.4b; T¼ 6.9,
Po0.001; Supplementary Fig. 3A and 4A). As a direct con-
sequence, contextual inﬂuences on option values were more
pronounced in the complete feedback contexts. Indeed, inter-
mediate value options (G25 and L25) in the complete feedback
contexts displayed a more pronounced deviation from absolute
expected value encoding (Fig. 4c,d). More precisely
G25 options acquired a negative value ( 4.8±1.6b; T¼ 2.9,
Po0.01), whereas L25 a positive one (þ 4.9±1.7b; T¼ 3.0,
Po0.01). Thus, as predicted from the analysis of model-derived
option values, absolute value learning and encoding suffers from
not being able to adequately ﬁt the value inversion between
intermediate value options in the complete context. Again, the
introduction of value contextualization proved sufﬁcient to
obviate this deﬁciency (Table 1 and Fig. 2d).
Neural Bayesian model selection. After showing at multiple
behavioural levels that option value contextualization occurs, we
turned to corroborate this claim using model-based fMRI41.
To achieve this, we devised a general linear model (GLM1) in
which we modelled as separated events the choice onset and
the outcome onset, each modulated by different parametric
modulators: chosen and unchosen option values (QC and QU)
and prediction errors (dC and dU). In a ﬁrst GLM (GLM1a)
we regressed the computational variables derived from the
ABSOLUTE model. In a second GLM (GLM1b) we used the
estimates from the RELATIVE model. We used the GLM1a to
generate second level contrasts and, replicating previous
ﬁndings, we found brain areas signiﬁcantly correlating with the
decision value (QC–QU) both positively (vmPFC) and negatively
(dmPFC,), and brain areas correlating with the decision
prediction error (dC–dU; vmPFC and ventral striatum: VS;
Po0.05, whole brain family-wise error (FWE) corrected; Fig. 5a
and Table 4; see also Supplementary Fig. 5)3,27,42,43. In a second
step, we estimated within this prefrontal and striatal areas the
same GLMs using Bayesian statistics. We found that the context-
dependent value encoding (GLM1b) provided a signiﬁcantly
better account of the network’s neural activity (1,511 voxels;
XP¼ 0.97; Fig. 5b)44. Importantly this result also held true for
each region of interest (ROI) separately (vmPFC: 936 voxels,
XP¼ 0.87; dmPFC: 71 voxels, XP¼ 0.97; VS: 505 voxels,
XP¼ 0.93; for the RELATIVE model. Thus, replicating previous
imaging ﬁndings implicating the medial prefrontal cortex and the
striatum in value learning and decision making, we found
that neural activity in these areas supports context-dependent
(GLM1b) as opposed to absolute (GLM1a) value signals. Note
that the ROIs were selected to favour the hypothesis that we want
to reject (GLM1a)45.
vmPFC activity is consistent with relative value encoding.
Model-based Bayesian fMRI analyses corroborated the
RELATIVE model. To further support relative value encoding
from the neural perspective, we also devised a categorical GLM
(GLM2), in which choice events were modelled separately for
each context and learning phase (early: ﬁrst eight trials; late: last
eight trials). For this analysis we focused on the vmPFC:
the region that has been more robustly implicated in value
encoding11,12. To avoid double dipping, we used a literature-
based independent vmPFC ROI. On the basis of the model
predictions and the assumption that the vmPFC represents values
signals, we expected higher activation in the punishment/
complete late trials (once the correct option L25 of the
punishment/complete context has acquired a positive value),
compared with reward/complete early trials (when the option
values are not yet very different from zero). On the other side, we
expected no such a difference in the partial contexts. To test this
hypothesis we submitted the choice-related regression coefﬁcients
to a three-way ANOVA with valence (reward and punishment),
feedback information (partial and complete) and learning phase
(early and late) as factors (Fig. 6a). We found a signiﬁcant main
effect of phase (F¼ 11.6, Po0.01), reﬂecting an overall learning-
induced increase of vmPFC signal. We also found a signiﬁcant
main effect of valence (F¼ 11.4, Po0.01), and a signiﬁcant
valence x information interaction (F¼ 17.3, Po0.001), indicating
that valence did not affect choice activations similarly in the
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Figure 5 | Neural model comparison. (a) Brain areas correlating positively and negatively with the difference between chosen and unchosen option value
(QC-QU; left and central column), and correlating positively with the difference between chosen and unchosen prediction error (dC–dU; right column). Signiﬁcant
voxels are displayed on the glass brains (top) and superimposed to slices of the between-subjects averaged anatomical T1 (bottom). Coronal slices correspond
to the blue lines on sagittal glass brains. Areas coloured in gray-to-black gradient on glass brains and in yellow on slices showed a signiﬁcant effect (Po0.05,
voxel level FWE corrected). Y coordinates are given in the MNI space. The results are from the GLM using the ABSOLUTE model parametric modulators
(GLM1a). (b) Bayesian model comparison (BMS) of GLMs regressing ABSOLUTE (ABS) and RELATIVE (REL) option values and prediction errors (GLM1a and
GLM1b). BMS is performed within the functional ROIs, presented on the left in yellow on the brain slices. Note that ROI selection avoids double dipping in favour
of the hypothesis we aimed to validate, since the ROIs were deﬁned from GLM1a (ABS) and GLM1a (ABS) was the hypothesis we aimed to reject.
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partial and complete contexts, respectively. Consistent with this
valence x information interaction, post hoc test indicated
signiﬁcant higher activations in the reward compared to the
punishment late trials in the partial contexts (T¼ 3.5, Po0.01),
but no such difference in the complete contexts (T¼ 0.7, P40.4).
Crucially and consistent with our predictions, post hoc test also
indicated signiﬁcant higher activations in the punishment early
trials compared to the reward late trials in the complete contexts
(T¼ 3.8, Po0.001), but no such difference in the partial contexts
(T¼ 0.2, P40.8). This result closely resembles that of option
value inversion in the post-learning test. In summary, in addition
to model-based fMRI analyses, we found that the activation
pattern of the vmPFC is still consistent with relative, rather than
absolute value encoding, also when analysed in a model-free
manner.
Outcome encoding is modulated by contextual discrimination.
Previous fMRI and lesions studies, using similar behavioural
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Figure 6 | Model-free neural evidence of value contextualization. (a) Bars represent the regression coefﬁcients extracted in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, as a function of the task contexts (represented by different colours) and leaning phase (early: ﬁrst eight trials; late: last eight trials). Regression
coefﬁcients are extracted from the model-free GLM2 within a sphere centered on literature-based coordinates of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex11.
(b) & (c) Bars represent the regression coefﬁcients for best4worst outcome contrast as a function of the task contexts. (‘þ0.5h40.0h’: best4worst
outcome contrast in the reward contexts; ‘0.0h40.5h’: best4worst outcome contrast in the punishment contexts). Regression coefﬁcients are
extracted from the model-free GLM3 within spheres centered on literature-based coordinates of the striatum and anterior insula8. Y coordinates are given
in the MNI space. Note that ROI selection avoids double dipping, since the ROIs were deﬁned from independent studies (metanalyses). *Po0.05 one
sample t-test comparing between regressors (black ‘*’) or to zero (white ‘*’; N¼ 28); NS: not signiﬁcant. Error bars represent s.e.m.
Table 4 | Brain activations.
Contrast Label [x y z ] BA AAL T S GLM
QC–QU
vmPFC [4 58  12] 10,11 Medial frontal gyrus, pars orbitalis 6.57 939 1
QU–QC
dmPFC [6 20 42] 8,32 Superior medial frontal gyrus 5.63 71 1
dC–dU
vmPFC [6 54 4] 10,11 Medial frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 7.00 1226 1
vlPFC [ 52 36 2] 45,47 Inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 5.79 119 1
Left-VS [ 16 12 8] — Putamen, pallidum 4.78 271 1
Right-VS [14 10 8] — Putamen, pallidum 4.57 234 1
þ0.5h40.0h (reward/partial)
Right-VS [16 12 6] — Putamen, pallidum 3.89 21 3
0.5h40.0h (punishment/partial)
AI [16 12 6] 48 Insula 4.02 43 3
AAL, automatic anatomic labelling; AI, anterior insula; BA, Brodmann area; dmPFC; dorso-medial prefrontal cortex; GLM, general linear model; S, size of the activation (voxels); T, t-values of the maxima;
vmPFC, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum; [x y z], MNI coordinates.
The table summarizes brain activations reported in Fig 5a and Supplementary Fig. 6a,b, signiﬁcant at Po0.05 FWE whole brain-level (GLM1a) or anatomic mask-level (GLM3) FWE corrected (one-
sample t-test; N¼ 28).
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tasks, suggest a role for the anterior insula (AI) in punishment
learning, in contrast to that of the VS in the reward
domain3,6,20,46–48. To challenge this hypothesis, we analysed
outcome encoding within an anatomic mask including the insular
cortex and the basal ganglia (Supplementary Fig. 6E). In the GLM
(GLM3) used for this analyses, outcome events were modelled
separately for each context and factual feedback value (RC).
GLM3 was also ‘model-free’, since the categories were not derived
from a computational model, but from the observable outcomes.
We computed for each context separately a best4worst outcome
contrast. Consistent with the neural opponency hypothesis
and replicating previous ﬁndings, we found voxels in the VS
signiﬁcantly activated by the þ 0.5h40.0h contrast in the
reward/partial context, thus encoding obtained rewards, and
voxels in the AI signiﬁcantly deactivated by the 0.0h4 0.5h
contrast in the punishment/partial context, thus encoding
obtained punishments (Po0.05 FWE mask-level corrected;
Supplementary Fig. 6A,B and Table 4). This functional
dissociation still held at more permissive threshold of Po0.001
uncorrected, and after literature-based independent ROIs test8.
In fact, to simultaneously and formally assess this functional
dissociation as well as the effect of contextual information on
outcome encoding, we submitted the outcome related contrasts to
a three-way ANOVA with valence (reward and punishment)
feedback information (partial and complete) and brain area
(VS and AI) as factors (Fig. 6b,c). Indeed, ANOVA indicated a
signiﬁcant main effect of brain system (VS versus AI; F¼ 45.8,
P40.001), which conﬁrms the fact that outcomes are encoded
with opposite signs in the two neural systems. We also found a
signiﬁcant main effect of feedback information (F¼ 4.2, Po0.05)
and a signiﬁcant valence x information interaction (F¼ 4.7,
Po0.05), indicating that valence did not affect outcome signals
similarly in the partial and complete contexts, respectively. Post
hoc testing revealed signiﬁcant differences in outcome encoding
between the reward/partial and the punishment/partial contexts
in both the AI (T¼ 2.9, Po0.01), and the VS (T¼ 2.3, Po0.05).
Such differences were not observed when comparing the reward/
complete to the punishment/complete contexts (To0.7, P40.4).
Interestingly, post hoc tests also revealed that, in the complete
feedback contexts, VS signiﬁcantly encoded avoidance (T¼ 2.4,
Po0.05) and, concomitantly, the AI stopped responding to
punishments (compared with the partial/punishment context:
T¼ 2.8, Po0.01). Finally, the triple valence x information x brain
area interaction was not signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the fact that the
signal increases similarly in both areas when moving from the
partial to the complete feedback contexts (in the striatum, from
zero, it becomes positive; in the insula, from negative, it becomes
zero; F¼ 1.9; P40.1).To further check that the result was not
dependent on the (independent) ROI selection, we explored
outcome related activations at an extremely permissive threshold
(Po0.01 uncorrected), conﬁrming no detectable implication of
the AI in the punishment/complete context (Supplementary
Fig. 6C,D). Altogether these results show that when additional
information is provided (that is, complete feedback contexts), and
therefore context value is better identiﬁed, punishment avoidance
signals converge to the VS allowing the opponent system to
‘switch off’.
Discussion
Healthy subjects performed an instrumental conditioning task,
involving learning to maximize rewards and minimize punish-
ments. Orthogonally to outcome valence, complete feedback
information (the outcome of the chosen and the unchosen
option) was provided to the subjects, in order to promote relative
value encoding. The data displayed convergent evidence of option
value contextualization at two independent behavioural levels:
instrumental choices, and post-learning choices. First, punish-
ment avoidance performances were matched to reward seeking
ones, a result that cannot be explained by absolute value
encoding; second, post-learning evaluation of the instrumental
options, especially for those of the complete feedback contexts,
displayed signiﬁcant biases that can be parsimoniously explained
assuming relative value encoding.
All these behavioural effects were submitted to computational
model-based analyses. More speciﬁcally our analyses compared
models representing two opposite views of the signals that drive
decision-making: context-independent absolute value signals
(that is, Q-learning) and context-dependent relative value signals
(RELATIVE)25. We made a deliberate effort to keep these models
as simple and parsimonious as possible. The RELATIVE model
essentially tracks the mean of the distribution of values of the
choice context (that is, the reference point) and uses it to centre
option values. Notably, this model represents a minimal
departure from a standard reinforcement learning algorithms
that imply context or option values are updated with a delta rule,
such as the Q-learning and actor–critic34. On the other side, the
RELATIVE model can be seen as the most parsimonious
algorithm implementation of a model that, departing from
experienced raw values, learns to identify, for each situation
(context) the ‘best’ and the ‘worst’ possible outcomes, based on an
explicit representation of the underlying generative process
(the task structure)49,50.
Punishment avoidance is computationally challenging. Simply
stated: how can the instrumental response (avoid a punishment)
be maintained despite the absence of further extrinsic reinforce-
ment (punishment)? As already known and replicated here,
absolute value learning methods are structurally not capable to
cope with this problem37,38. In fact, the ABSOLUTE model
predicted signiﬁcant higher performances in the reward
compared with the punishment context. Psychological models,
such as the two-factor theory, suggested that a successful
punishment avoidance could acquire a positive value and
therefore act as intrinsic reinforcement to sustain learning17–20,22.
The RELATIVE model embodies this idea by considering outcomes
relative to the context in which they were delivered (RC–V). As a
consequence of this feature, successful punishment avoidance (the
neutral outcome 0.0h), acquired a positive value in the punishment
avoidance context (where V is negative), providing a substrate for
reinforcing the response. By doing so, it managed to equalize the
performances between the reward and punishment context, as
observed in human subjects.
We probed relative value encoding with an additional, and
independent, behavioural measure. As in previous studies,
we asked subjects to retrieve the value of the options after
learning29,30. In this last task, options were presented in all
possible combinations and were therefore extrapolated from their
original choice context. Post-learning choices showed clear signs
of value encoding. In fact, G75 choice rate was higher compared to
L25 choice rate, despite the fact that their instrumental choice rate
was similar. However, more in-depth analyses indicated that the
behavioural pattern was more consistent with relative, rather than
absolute value encoding. Subjects indeed failed to correctly
retrieve the value of intermediate value options, to the point of
preferring a lower value option (L25) to a higher value option
(G25) in the complete feedback information, where relative value
encoding was enhanced. Importantly, only the RELATIVE model
was able to precisely capture this choice pattern (out-of-sample
validation). The across task stability of relative value further
corroborated our assumptions regarding the model, namely that
value contextualization occurs within the learning rule and not
within the policy. This effect is reminiscent of choice irrationality
induced by context dependency (that is, preference reversal
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or ‘less is more’ effect) as if the adaptive function of value
contextualization (in our case coping with punishment avoidance
in the learning tasks) was traded against a bias of value estimates
in the post-learning test51,52. Thus, as far as we were able to infer
option values from choice data, they showed signs of context-
dependency.
Replicating previous results, we found neural correlates of
option values and prediction errors in a well-established
reinforcement learning and decision-making network, including
cortical and subcortical brain regions3,27,42,43. Relative and
absolute value regressors shared a signiﬁcant part of their
variance due to the fact that both depend on the same history
of choices and outcomes, and that the two models are structurally
similar (nested) and similarly affected by task factors. Given these
premises, to overcome this issue and corroborate relative
value encoding, we implemented, as in recent studies, a neural
model comparison analysis53,54. Bayesian model comparison
showed that, within this prefrontal-striatal network, the context-
dependent value-learning model (RELATIVE) provided a better
explanation for BOLD responses than the ABSOLUTE model,
which was used to generate the ROIs. Everything else being
constant (individual history of choices and outcomes), the
difference in model evidence could only be attributed to the
value contextualization process itself, and therefore corroborates
behavioural model selection. This model-based fMRI result has
been backed up by a model-free analysis showing that signal
changes in vmPFC (the core of the brain valuation system), once
decomposed as a function of learning phase and task factors,
displayed a pattern fully compatible with relative value encoding.
More precisely we found that late vmPFC signal in punishment/
complete context, was higher compared to the early signal
reward/partial context: an effect that closely resembles that of the
post-leaning value inversion.
Our ﬁnding of a functional double dissociation between the
striatum and the insula in positive and negative outcome
encoding perfectly replicates our previous results, and adds to a
now critical mass of studies suggesting the existence of an
opponent insular system dedicated to punishment-based learning
and decision making3,6,20,46–48,55. Indeed, we found that the AI
represented received negative outcomes in the punishment/partial
context, in opposition to the pattern of activity in the ventral
striatum, which represented received positive outcomes in the
reward/partial condition. Strikingly, we found that in the
punishment/complete context, negative outcome encoding in
the AI faded, while the ventral striatum was concomitantly taking
over. Globally, these results suggest that, by default, positive and
negative values are represented in opposite directions by two
opponent channels to ensure optimal outcome encoding in face
of the impossibility of negative ﬁring rates56–58. They also
indicate that when relative valuation is facilitated (here in
presence of complete feedback information), the ventral system is
tuned to respond to ‘successful avoidance’ (intrinsic
reinforcement) as it does for rewards20,22. This suggests that
value contextualization can limit the need for simultaneously
mobilizing multiple neural systems and therefore promotes
neural parsimony. In our design, this effect was achieved in
presence of the complete feedback information. Accordingly
counterfactual outcome processing has been tightly associated to
context-dependent (that is, relative) decision-making models,
such as the regret theory24–26. However, it is nonetheless possible
that in previous studies other task features, such as blocked design
or explicit information about the outcome contingencies, could
have concurred to reframe punishment avoidance tasks in order
to induce the striatum to respond to successful avoidance36,59–62.
To summarize, our data suggest that as soon as an agent is
engaged in a utility maximization-learning task, (s)he learns
concomitantly the value of the available options and the value of
the choice context in which they are encountered (the reference
point). These quantities, option and context values, do not remain
segregated but are rather integrated, so that the option value,
originally encoded in an absolute scale, becomes relative to their
choice context. Our study shows how value contextualization has
the adaptive function of permitting efﬁcient avoidance learning.
Nevertheless, option value, being learned in a context-dependent
manner, can produce suboptimal preferences (value inversion:
irrational behaviour) when the options are extrapolated from
their original choice context (for example, post learning). In the
brain, value updating, supposedly achieved via prediction errors,
is originally implemented by two different systems for the reward
(reward system: ventral striatum) and the punishment (opponent
system: anterior insula) domains, respectively, to obviate the
difﬁculty to efﬁciently encode a large range of negative values.
As a result of value contextualization, the reward responds
to successful avoidance (per se a neutral outcome) and
concomitantly the activity in the opponent system is suppressed.
Methods
Subjects. We tested 28 subjects (16 females; age 25.6±5.4 years). Power
calculation studies suggested that a statistically valid sample size for fMRI study
should be comprised of between 16 and 24 subjects63. We included N¼ 28 subjects
based on a pessimistic drop-out rate of 15%. We experienced no technical
problems, so we were able to include all 28 subjects. Subjects were screened for the
absence of any history of neurological and psychiatric disease or any current
psychiatric medication, for right handedness and for normal or correct to normal
vision. The research was carried out following the principles and guidelines for
experiments including human participants provided in the declaration of Helsinki
(1964). The local Ethical Committee of the University of Trento approved the study
and subjects provided written informed consent prior to their inclusion. To sustain
motivation throughout the experiment, subjects were remunerated according to the
exact amount of money won in the experiment plus a ﬁxed amount for their travel
to the MRI center.
Behavioural tasks. Subjects performed a probabilistic instrumental learning task
adapted from previous imaging and patient studies3,6,27,28. Subjects were ﬁrst
provided with written instructions, which were reformulated orally if necessary
(see Supplementary Note 3). They were informed that the aim of the task was to
maximize their payoff, that reward seeking and punishment avoidance were equally
important and that only factual (and not counterfactual) outcomes counted. Prior
to entering the scanner, subjects performed a shorter (training) session, aimed to
familiarize them with the task’s timing and responses. In the scanner subjects
performed four learning sessions. Options were abstract symbols taken from the
Agathodaimon alphabet. Each session contained eight novel options divided into
four novel ﬁxed pairs of options. The pairs of options were ﬁxed so that a given
option was always presented with the same other option. Thus, within each session,
pairs of options represented stable choice contexts. Within sessions, each pair of
options was presented 24 times for a total of 96 trials. The four option pairs
corresponded to the four contexts (reward/partial, reward/complete, punishment/
partial and punishment/complete), which were associated with different pairs of
outcomes (reward contexts: winning 0.5h versus nothing; punishment contexts:
losing 0.5h versus nothing) and a different quantity of information being given at
feedback (partial and complete). In the partial feedback contexts, only the outcome
about the chosen option was provided, while in the complete feedback contexts
both the outcome of the chosen and the unchosen option were provided. Within
each pair, the two options were associated to the two possible outcomes with
reciprocal probabilities (0.75/0.25 and 0.25/0.75). During each trial, one option was
randomly presented on the left and one on the right side of a central ﬁxation cross.
Pairs of options were presented in a pseudorandomized and unpredictable manner
to the subject (intermixed design). The side on which a given option was presented
was also pseudorandomized, such that a given option was presented an equal
number of times in the left and the right of the central cross. Subjects were required
to select between the two options by pressing one of the corresponding two buttons
with their left or right thumb to select the leftmost or the rightmost option,
respectively, within a 3,000ms time window. After the choice window, a red
pointer appeared below the selected option for 500ms. At the end of the trial the
options disappeared and the selected one was replaced by the outcome (‘þ 0.5h’,
‘0.0h’ or ‘ 0.5h’) for 3,000ms. In the complete information contexts, the outcome
corresponding to the unchosen option (counterfactual) was also displayed. Note
that between cues the outcome probability was truly independent on a trial-by-trial
basis, even if it was anti-correlated in average. Thus, in a complete feedback trial,
subjects could observe the same outcome from both cues on 37.5% of trials and
different outcomes from each cue on 62.5% of trials. A novel trial started after a
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ﬁxation screen (1,000ms, jittered between 500–1,500ms). During the anatomical
scan and after the four sessions subjects performed a post-learning assessment of
option value. This task involved only the 8 options (2 4 pairs) of the last session,
which were presented in all possible pair-wise combinations (28, not including
pairs formed by the same option)29,30. Each pair of options was presented 4 times,
leading to a total of 112 trials. Instructions were provided orally after the end of the
last learning session. Subjects were informed that they would be presented pairs of
options taken from the last session, and that all pairs had not necessarily been
displayed together before. During each trial, they had to indicate the option with
the highest value by pressing on the buttons as they had done during the learning
task. Subjects were also advised that there was no money at stake, but encouraged
to respond as they would have if that were the case. In order to prevent explicit
memorizing strategies, subjects were not informed that they would have performed
this task until the end of the fourth (last) session of the learning test. Timing of the
post-test differed from the learning test in that the choice was self-paced and in the
absence of the outcome phase.
Behavioural analyses. From the learning test, we extracted the choice rate as
dependent variable. Statistical analyses were performed on the percentage of cor-
rect choices, i.e., choices directed toward the most advantageous stimulus
(most rewarding or the less punishing), sorted as a function of the context
(see Behavioral tasks). Statistical effects were assessed using two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA with (1) feedback information and (2) feedback valence as
factors. Between-context differences in correct responses were also tested post hoc
using a two-sided, one-sample t-test. Reaction times were also extracted from the
learning test and submitted to the same factorial analyses used for the correct
choice rate (see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1). Choice rate was
also extracted from the post-learning test and sorted for each option separately, as
the percentage of choice toward a given stimulus taking into account all possible
comparisons. Post-learning choice rate was submitted to three-way repeated-
measures ANOVA, to assess the effects of (1) feedback information, (2) feedback
valence and (3) option correctness. We also performed a two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA focused on the intermediate value options, assessing the
effect of (1) feedback information and (2) valence. Between-option differences in
post-learning choices were tested post hoc using a two-sided, one-sample t-test.
As a control analysis, the percentage of direct choices involving the G25 and the L25
cues (that is, the intermediate value cues) has also been analysed separately for each
comparison (see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2). All statistical
analyses were performed using Matlab (www.mathworks.com) with the addition
of the Statistical toolbox and other free-download functions (rm_anova2.m,
RMAOV33.m).
Computational models. We analysed our data with model-free reinforcement
learning algorithms34. The goal of all models was to ﬁnd in each choice context
(state: s) the option that maximizes the cumulative reward R. We compared two
alternative computational models: a Q-learning model, extended to account for
counterfactual learning (ABSOLUTE), which instantiates ‘absolute value-based’
learning and decision making by learning option values independently of the
choice context in which they are presented25,34; the RELATIVE model which learns
option values relative to the choice context in which they are presented35–38,64
(Fig. 3).
(1) ABSOLUTE model
At trial t the chosen (c) option value of the current context (s) is updated with
the Rescorla-Wagner rule (also called delta-rule)65:
Qtþ 1 s; cð Þ ¼ Qt s; cð Þþ a1dC;t
and
Qtþ 1 s; uð Þ ¼ Qt s; uð Þþ a2 dU;t;
where a1 is the learning rate for the chosen option and a2 the learning rate for the
unchosen (u) option (counterfactual learning rate). dC and dU are prediction error
terms calculated as follows:
dC;t ¼ RC;tQt s; cð Þ
(update in both the partial and complete feedback contexts) and
dU;t ¼ RU;tQt s; uð Þ
(in the complete feedback contexts only).
(2) RELATIVE model
We also devised a new model (RELATIVE), which, instantiates the ‘relative
value-based’ learning and decision-making. The key idea behind RELATIVE model
is that it separately learns and tracks the choice context value (V(s)), used as the
reference point to which an outcome should be compared before updating option
values. Previous algorithms, such the actor-critic and the advantage learning
model, inspired the RELATIVE model (see Supplementary Note 2, Supplementary
Fig. 3 and Supplementary Table 3 for additional model comparison analyses
including the actor-critic model). All these models implement relative value
learning of option values, based on V(s) estimates. The RELATIVE model differs in
that it is extended to account for counterfactual feedback and that V(s) is learnt in
an ‘random-policy’ manner (that is, the state value is independent from the policy
followed by the subject. (see Supplementary Note 2, Supplementary Fig. 4 and
Supplementary Table 4 for additional model comparison analyses supporting these
assumptions). Crucially V(s) is not merely the choice-probability weighted sum of
options’ value, but rather affects (controls) them.
In fact V(s) is used to centre option prediction errors as follows:
dC;t ¼ RC;t Vt sð ÞQt s; cð Þ
and
dU;t ¼ RU;t Vt sð ÞQt s; uð Þ
(in the complete feedback contexts only). As a consequence the option values are
no longer calculated in an absolute scale, but relatively to their choice context value
V(s). Context value is also learned via a delta rule:
Vtþ 1 sð Þ ¼ Vt sð Þþ a3dV;t
Where a3 is the context value learning rate and dV is a prediction error-term
calculated as follows:
dV;t ¼ RV;t Vt sð Þ
where t is the number of trials and RV is the context-level outcome at trial t:
a global measure that encompasses both the chosen and unchosen options. In the
complete feedback contexts the average outcome trial (RV) is calculated as the
average of the factual and the counterfactual outcomes as follows:
RV;t ¼ RC;t þRU;t
 
=2:
Given that the average outcome trial (RV) is meant to be a context-level measure, in
order to incorporate unchosen option value information in RV also in the partial
feedback contexts, we considered Qt(s,u) a good proxy of RU,t and calculated RV,t as
follows (see Supplementary Note 2 and Supplementary Table 2 for model
comparison justiﬁcations of these assumptions):
RV;t ¼ RC;t þQt s; uð Þ
 
=2:
To sum up, our model space included 2 models: the ABSOLUTE model
(Q-learning) and the RELATIVE model. In all models decision-making relied on a
softmax function:
Pt s; að Þ ¼ 1þ exp b Qt s; bð ÞQt s; að Þð Þð Þð Þ 1;
where b is the inverse temperature parameter. The Matlab codes implementing the
computational models are available upon request to the corresponding author.
Parameters optimization and model selection procedures. We optimized
model parameters, the temperature (b), the factual (a1), the counterfactual (a2) and
the contextual (a3) learning rates (in the RALATIVE model only), by minimizing
the negative log likelihood (LLmax) and (in a separate optimization procedure) the
negative log of posterior probability (LPP) of the data given different parameters
settings using Matlab’s fmincon function, initialized at multiple starting points of
the parameter space, as previously described66,67. Negative log-likelihoods (LLmax)
were used to compute classical model selection criteria. The LPP was used to
compute the exceedance probability and the expected frequencies of the model.
We computed at the individual level (random effects) the Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC),
AIC ¼ 2df þ 2LLmax;
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
BIC ¼ log ntrialsð Þdf þ 2LLmax
and the Laplace approximation to the model evidence (LPP);
LPP ¼ log P D jM; yð Þð ÞÞ;
where D, M and y represent the data, model and model parameters respectively.
P(yn) is calculated based on the parameters value retrieved from the parameter
optimization procedure, assuming learning rates beta distributed
(betapdf(parameter,1.1,1.1)) and softmax temperature gamma-distributed
(gampdf(parameter,1.2,5))68. The present distributions have been chosen to be
relatively ﬂat over the range of parameters retrieved in the previous and present
studies. The LPP increases with the likelihood (which measures the accuracy of the
ﬁt) and is penalized by the integration over the parameter space (which measures
the complexity of the model). The LPP, as the BIC or AIC, thus represent a
trade-off between accuracy and complexity and can guide model selection.
Individual LPPs were fed to the mbb-vb-toolbox (https://code.google.com/p/
mbb-vb-toolbox/)40. This procedure estimates the expected frequencies of the
model (denoted PP) and the exceedance probability (denoted XP) for each model
within a set of models, given the data gathered from all subjects. Expected
frequency quantiﬁes the posterior probability, i.e., the probability that the model
generated the data for any randomly selected subject. This quantity must be
compared to chance level (one over the number of models in the search space).
Exceedance probability quantiﬁes the belief that the model is more likely than all
the other models of the set, or in other words, the conﬁdence in the model having
the highest expected frequency. We considered the ‘best model’, the model which
positively fulﬁlled all the criteria.
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Model simulation analyses. Once we had optimized models’ parameters, we
analysed their generative performance by analysing the model simulation of the
data69. Model estimates of choice probability were generated trial-by-trial using the
best individual parameters in the individual history of choices and outcomes.
Model choice probability was then submitted to the same statistical analysis as the
actual choices. The evaluation of generative performances involved two steps: ﬁrst,
the assessment of the model’s ability to reproduce the key statistical effects of the
data; second, the assessment of the model’s ability to match subjects’ choices. The
ﬁrst step essentially involved within-simulated data comparisons, in both the form
of ANOVA and post hoc one-sample t-test. The second step involved comparison
between simulated and actual data with a one-sample t-test, and adjusting the
signiﬁcance level for the multiple comparisons (see the results reported in Table 1).
We also tested models’ performances out of the sample by assessing their ability to
account for post-learning test choices. Concerning the post-learning test analysis,
under the assumption that choices in the post-learning test were dependent on the
ﬁnal option values, we calculated the probability of choice in the post-learning test
using a softmax, using the same individual choice temperature optimized during
the learning test (note that similar results have been obtained when optimizing
a b speciﬁc to the post-learning test). On the basis of model-estimate choice
probability, we calculated the log-likelihood of post-learning choices that we
compared between computational models. Finally, we submitted the model-
estimate post-learning choice probability to the same statistical analyses as the
actual choices (ANOVA and post hoc t-test; within-simulated data comparison)
and we compared modelled choices to the actual data (pair-wise comparisons,
corrected for multiple comparisons; Table 1).
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. A 4T Bruker MedSpec Biospin MR
scanner (CiMEC, Trento, Italy) and an eight-channel head coil were used to
acquire both high resolution T1-weighted anatomical MRI using a 3D MPRAGE
with a resolution of 1mm3 voxel and T2*-weighted Echo planar imaging (EPI).
The parameters of the acquisition were the following, 47 slices acquired in
ascending interleaved order, the in-plan resolution was 3mm3 voxels, the
repetition time 2.2 s, and the echo time was 21ms. A tilted plane acquisition
sequence was used to optimize functional sensitivity to the orbitofrontal cortex70.
The acquisition started from the inferior surface of the temporal lobe. This
implicated that, in most subjects, the acquired volume did not include the inferior
part of the cerebellum. Preprocessing of the T1-weighted structural images
consisted in coregistration with the mean EPI, segmentation and normalization to
a standard T1 template, and average across all subjects to allow group-level
anatomical localization. Preprocessing of EPI consisted in spatial realignment,
normalization using the same transformation as structural images, and spatial
smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a full width a half-maximum of
8mm. Final voxel size was 2mm3. Preprocessing was realized using SPM8
(www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk).
fMRI data analyses. EPI images were analysed in an event-related manner within
the general linear model (GLM) framework, using SPM8 software. In GLM1, each
trial was modelled as having two time points, corresponding to choice and outcome
display onsets, modelled by two separate regressors. Choice onset and outcome
onset were then modulated with different parametric regressors. In order to
account for irrelevant motor or visual activations, the ﬁrst parametric modulators
for GLM1 were: (1) the response (coded as 1 and  1, for the right or left response,
respectively) for the choice onset, and (2) the number of outcomes on the screen
(codes as 1 and 2 for the partial and complete feedback context, respectively) for
the outcome onset. These control parametric modulators generated motor and
visual activations (data not shown). To correct for motion artifact, all GLMs also
included the subject/session speciﬁc realignment parameters as nuisance covariates.
The GLM1a and GLM1b differed in the computational model used to generate the
parametric modulators. In addition to motor and visual regressors, in GLM1 the
choice onsets were modulated by the trial-by-trial estimates of QC and QU, whereas
the outcome onsets by the trial-by-trial estimates of dC and dU. In the partial
feedback trials, the unchosen prediction error regressor (dU) was systematically set
at zero. Computational regressors were generated for each subject using the group
level mean of the best individual parameters and the individual history of choices
and outcomes. Regressors were z-scored before regression in order to ensure
between-model, between-subject and between-modulator commensurability of the
regression coefﬁcients (Table 3). The computational variables of the GLM1a were
derived from the ABSOLUTE computational model. GLM1b was structurally
identical to GLM1a, except for the fact that the computational variables were
derived from the RELATIVE model. All activations concerning GLM1 reported in
the ﬁgure 5 survived a threshold of Po0.05 with voxel level whole brain FWE
correction for multiple comparisons. In GLM2, each trial was modelled as having
one-time points, corresponding to the stimulus display onsets. The choice onsets
were split into eight different events (categories) as a function of task factors
(feedback information x outcome valence) and the position of the trial within the
learning curve (early: ﬁrst eight trials; late: last eight trials; we did not include the
mid eight trials so as to only include in each category trials belonging as clearly as
possible to the ‘incremental’ versus the ‘plateau’ phase of the learning curves). In
GLM3, each trial was modelled as having one-time points, corresponding to the
outcome display onsets. The outcome onsets were split into eight different events
(categories) as a function of the task factors (feedback information x outcome
valence) and obtained outcome (RC). We computed at the ﬁrst level a best4worst
outcome contrast for each context separately (‘þ 0.5h40.0h’: best4worst
outcome contrast in the reward contexts; ‘0.0h4 0.5h’: best4worst outcome
contrast in the punishment contexts). All GLMs were estimated using classical
statistical techniques and linear contrast of parametric modulators were computed
at the individual level and then taken to a group-level random effect analysis
(one-sample t-test). Based on our hypotheses, second level contrasts of GLM3 were
estimated within an anatomic mask encompassing bilaterally the insula and the
basal ganglia (caudate, putamen and pallidum; 49 105 voxels of 2mm3)
(Supplementary Fig. 6E). The mask has been designed using MARINA software
(http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/ext/). Activations concerning GLM3 and
reported in yellow in Supplementary Fig. 6 survived a threshold of Po0.05 with
voxel level anatomic mask FWE correction, that is, the multiple comparison
accounted for the number of voxels in the mask rather than the whole brain
(small volume correction). Activations are reported in the coordinates space of the
Montreal Neurology Institute (MNI). Activations were anatomically labelled using
the Brodmann and the automatic anatomical labelling template implemented by
the software MRIcron (www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro).
Region of interest analyses. ROI analyses served three purposes: (1) assess and
compare the goodness of ﬁt of the neural data between the RELATIVE and the
ABSOLUTE computational model parametric modulators (GLM1); (2) assess
choice related brain activity in the vmPFC as a function of the task contexts
(GLM2); (3) assess outcome encoding in the VS and the AI as a function of the task
contexts (GLM3). All ROI analyses were designed to avoid double dipping in
favour of the hypothesis we aimed to validate45. To assess goodness of ﬁt (neural
model selection), we ﬁrst deﬁned from GLM1a (ABSOLUTE’s regressors) a
‘task network’ mask including all the voxels which survived cluster level Po0.05
(FWE corrected) in the following contrasts: positive and negative correlation with
‘QC–QU’ (decision value) and ‘dC—dU’ (decision prediction error) (see Fig. 5a).
Within this mask (total voxels number¼ 1,511), we estimated GLM1a and GLM1b
(best model regressors) using Bayesian statistics, which provided log evidence for
each GLM. Log evidence was then fed to BMS random effects analysis, which
computed the exceedance probability of each GLM within the mask44. This analysis
indicates which GLM better explained the neural data. To avoid double dipping in
favour of the hypothesis that we wanted to support, we selected the ROIs, which
favoured the hypothesis we wanted to reject (GLM1a, ABSOLUTE model)45.
The second ROI analysis was devoted to study how task factors (contexts) affected
choice related activity. A spherical ROI of 4mm diameter was centred on
ventromedial prefrontal coordinates reported to be signiﬁcantly associated with
decision value in a recent meta-analysis11. Regression coefﬁcients from the GLM2
were submitted to a repeated measure three-way ANOVA analysis with valence
(reward and punishment), feedback information (partial and complete) and
learning phase (early, late) as factors. The third ROI analysis was devoted to study
how task factors (contexts) affected outcome encoding. Spherical ROIs of 4mm
were centered on striatal (VS) and insular (AI) coordinates reported to be
signiﬁcantly associated with reward and punishment prediction errors in a recent
meta-analysis8. Regression coefﬁcients were submitted to a repeated measure three-
way ANOVA analysis with neural system (VS or AI) and valence (reward and
punishment) and feedback information (partial and complete) as factors. In the
second and third ROI analyses the post hoc signiﬁcance assessed with two-sided
one-sample t-test.
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